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Native American Sovereignty Meets a Bend in the 
Road: Difficulties in Nevada v. Hicks 
The path the Supreme Court has forged with regard to tribal 
sovereignty has meandered through a variety of landscapes with little 
predictability. The Court finally established a guiding light for de-
termining tribal jurisdiction in the 1980s through the seminal case, 
Montana v. United States,1 but since that time has taken several turns 
in the road. Most recently, in Nevada v. Hicks,2 the Court ventured 
away from the security of known paths by redefining and limiting the 
scope of tribal sovereignty in two ways. First, the Court’s recharac-
terization of the traditional approach for determining tribal authority 
over nonmembers outlined in Montana resulted in a constriction of 
the Court’s precedent regarding the role of land ownership and 
Montana’s exceptions. Second, the Court’s limit of tribal authority 
to try federal § 1983 claims suggests that tribes may be limited in ad-
judicating certain federal claims in their own courts. 
This Note begins with a discussion of Native American judicial 
authority, addressing both tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers and 
tribal jurisdiction over federal claims. Part II briefly explains the fac-
tual and procedural background of the Nevada v. Hicks decision. 
Part III analyzes the Court’s application of the Montana test and the 
exhaustion doctrine to determine the tribe’s jurisdiction in Nevada v. 
Hicks. Part IV critiques this analysis, while Part V suggests possible 
routes that the Court may take in the future, especially with respect 
to the importance of land status under Montana. Part VI concludes 
that the Court’s constriction of these tests leaves tribes with little re-
course against nonmember civil offenders. 
I. THE FEDERAL LAW FRAMEWORK OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION 
Since 1978, Native American tribes have had limited jurisdiction 
over those who do not belong to their tribes.3 This section estab-
 
 1. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 2. 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001). 
 3. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (denying tribal 
courts criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers); Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (limiting tribal court 
authority over non-Indians in civil matters). 
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lishes a foundation for understanding tribal jurisdiction over non-
members by first discussing tribal jurisdiction over acts of nonmem-
bers and then evaluating general tribal jurisdiction over federal 
claims. 
A. Tribal Authority over Nonmembers 
“Indian tribes have long been held to have ‘attributes of sover-
eignty over both their members and their territory.’”4 Although the 
relationship between tribes and the federal government has divested 
tribes of certain aspects of their inherent sovereignty,5 and the Court 
has firmly established Congress’ plenary power over Indian country,6 
 
 4. Sandra Hansen, Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country 1990, 16 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 319, 324 (1991) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 
142 (1980); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); and citing United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56 
(1978)). 
 5. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), the Court recognized In-
dian tribes as separate sovereigns with inherent sovereignty but concluded that this sovereignty 
was diminished as a result of European discovery of the land. Id. at 587; see also Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1831) (affirming divestiture of Indian tribes’ sov-
ereign rights to convey lands and enter into treaties with foreign nations). The Court later 
came to describe Indian nations as “domestic dependent nations,” comparing the relationship 
between tribes and the federal government to the relationship between a ward and its guard-
ian. See id., 30 U.S. at 17. 
Cherokee Nation, though based in part upon egocentric ideals, see id. at 17 (Indians “are 
in a state of pupilage”), has formed a basis for the ideas that Congress has broad power to leg-
islate on behalf of tribes and the Court has little power to review Congress’s acts so long as 
they are rationally tied to Congress’s obligation towards Indians. See, e.g., Washington v. Con-
federated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 535 (1974) (finding statute 
creating checkerboard state and tribal jurisdiction on reservation constitutional because ration-
ally tied to the interest of protecting Indians). 
 6. Federal statute defines Indian country as 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, includ-
ing rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian com-
munities . . . , and (c) all Indian allotments . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). 
Congress’s plenary power over Indian Country has been established in many cases. See, 
e.g., Washington, 439 U.S. 463 (holding that a state has power to create a checkerboard juris-
dictional pattern when acting in response to congressional acts); United States v. Antelope, 
430 U.S. 641, 648 (1977) (finding the Major Crimes Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994), constitu-
tional, although resulting in different burdens of proof for tribal members and non-Indians and 
holding that “[s]ince Congress has undoubted constitutional power to prescribe a criminal 
code applicable in Indian country, [it makes no legal difference] that the federal scheme differs 
from a state criminal code otherwise applicable”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) 
(legislation will not be disturbed as long as it is rationally tied to the fulfillment of Congress’s 
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the Court has nonetheless emphasized that tribes retain many rights 
of internal self-government, including “the power to punish tribal 
offenders, . . . to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic 
relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for 
members.”7 
Despite the fact that Indian tribes retain authority over internal 
aspects of tribal government because of their inherent sovereignty, 
Congress and the Court have abrogated the tribes’ authority over 
nonmembers.8 This section will focus on tribal jurisdiction over civil 
acts by nonmembers. It will first analyze tribal regulatory authority 
over nonmembers under the test established in Montana v. United 
States,9 highlighting two exceptions to this test. It will next look at 
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
1. Tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers 
“Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation 
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.”10 The Court has 
firmly established that tribes have no jurisdiction over nonmember 
defendants involved in criminal actions in Indian country,11 but the 
 
unique obligation towards Indians); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding 
that Congress’s power to legislate on behalf of Indians includes the right to abrogate their 
treaties and that such legislation is not subject to judicial review); United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375 (1886) (recognizing congressional authority to grant the federal government 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country). 
 7. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (1981). 
 8. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (“[T]he dependent status of Indian tribes within our 
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine 
their external relations. But the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe 
and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations 
among members of a tribe.”); see also supra note 5 (describing tribal sovereignty). 
 9. 450 U.S. 544. 
 10. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987); see also Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–53 (“Executive branch 
officials have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil juris-
diction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a 
significant interest.” (citing 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 214 (1900); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 174 (1885); 17 
Op. Att’y Gen. 134 (1881))). But see Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 451–52 (1997) 
(dismissing the statement in Iowa Mutual on the grounds that Montana established a pre-
sumption against tribal sovereignty); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2321 
(2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (same). 
 11. Tribes have no authority to criminally try non-Indians even when the criminal acts 
occur on reservation lands, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), al-
though they do retain some authority to criminally try tribal members. See Wheeler, 435 U.S.  
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Court has not created a bright-line rule for tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmember defendants in civil actions. Instead, the Court has cre-
ated a general common law framework for evaluating tribal jurisdic-
tion in civil proceedings. Montana v. United States12 serves as the 
baseline. 
In Montana the Court determined that the Crow Tribe had no 
authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land 
owned by non-Indians within reservation boundaries.13 The Court 
held that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not 
 
313 (holding that a tribe may prosecute members for lesser offenses arising out of same facts as 
a major crime); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe is the guiding authority for tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. The Suquamish Indian Tribe commenced criminal proceedings against two non-
Indians residing on the Port Madison Reservation in Washington. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. 
When the defendants appealed jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that “Indians do not have 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by Con-
gress,” id. at 208, rejecting the tribe’s argument that criminal jurisdiction was part of its “re-
tained inherent powers of government.” Id. at 195–96. The Court determined that such juris-
diction would be “inconsistent with their status” as domestic dependent nations. Id. at 208 
(quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Rec-
onciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-
Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1139 [hereinaf-
ter Skibine, Reconciling]. See generally N. Bruce Duthu & Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court 
Strikes Two More Blows Against Tribal Self-Determination, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T., Fall 
2001, at 118, 119 (Fall 2001) (“Oliphant dramatically influenced the nature and scope of liti-
gation in federal Indian law by inviting challenges not merely to the exercise of inherent tribal 
authority, but rather to its very existence.”). However, the Court explained that “Indian tribes 
do retain elements of ‘quasi-sovereign’ authority” and that these “retained powers are not such 
that they are limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments.” Ol-
iphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (citation omitted). 
One week after Oliphant, in Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, the Court held that the Navajo 
Tribe had authority to convict a tribal member of certain crimes, even though he was later tried 
in federal court, finding that tribal powers of self-government encompassed internal “relations 
among members of a tribe.” Id. at 314–16, 326; see also Skibine, Reconciling, supra, at 1139 
(citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326) (discussing the differences in the Court’s reasoning of Ol-
iphant and Wheeler). Notably, the only previous decisions to address tribal authority over ex-
ternal relations were Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11–12 (1831), and 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), both of which “made clear . . . that . . . ‘ex-
ternal relations’ . . . meant relations between Indian nations and foreign nations.” Skibine, 
Reconciling, supra, at 1139–40 (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11–12) (footnote omitted). 
In fact, later “the Court adopted the position that even if external relations were involved, the 
exercise of tribal jurisdiction was not per se inconsistent with tribal status . . . . [I]n cases in-
volving external relations, the tribe bore the burden to show that jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers was necessary to tribal self-government.” Id. at 1140 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–
66). 
 12. 450 U.S. 544. 
 13. Id. at 557. 
4REE.DOC 3/23/02  11:52 AM 
137] Native American Sovereignty 
 141 
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”14 Because the 
tribe’s regulation of nonmembers on their fee lands “bore no clear 
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, the gen-
eral principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not authorize the 
Crow Tribe to regulate the non-Indian fishing.”15 Thus, the Court 
set forth a general rule that tribes have limited power to regulate 
nonmember conduct on non-Indian fee land within a reservation. 
However, the Court recognized that had the tribe sought to 
regulate activities occurring on tribal trust lands, rather than on non-
Indian fee lands, the tribe would have had authority to either condi-
tion nonmembers’ entry or to exclude them altogether.16 Addition-
ally, despite the Court’s finding that inherent sovereignty does not 
give rise to “regulatory authority over non-Indians,”17 the Court de-
termined that in two cases “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign 
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians 
on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”18 
 
 
 14. Id. at 565 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191(1978)). The Court found that the tribe 
was “implicit[ly] divest[ed] of [tribal] sovereignty [over] . . . the relations between an Indian 
tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.” Id. at 564 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326). 
Montana is viewed as an extension of the notion of divestiture suggested in Oliphant, 
435 U.S. 191 (1978). See Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, 119; see also supra note 11 (dis-
cussing Oliphant). 
 15. H. Scott Althouse, Idaho Nibbles at Montana: Carving out a Third Exception for 
Tribal Jurisdiction over Environmental and Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 721, 
734 (2001) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65). 
 16. The Court stated, 
  [T]he regulatory issue before us is a narrow one . . . . [T]he Tribe may prohibit 
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the 
United States in trust for the Tribe . . . . [I]f the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish 
or hunt on such lands, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing 
bag and creel limits. 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 557; see also Skibine, Reconciling, supra note 11, at 1140 n.175:   
[O]ne can argue that Montana adopted the position that what made [the] case an 
exercise of external relations was not that it involved non-Indians; rather it involved 
non-Indians on non-Indian lands. Therefore, if the fishing by the non-Indians had 
taken place on tribal land, one could argue that the fishing did not involve external 
relations; thus, the burden would still be on the non-Indians to show why tribal ju-
risdiction was not necessary to tribal self-government. 
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 557); cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982) (“Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent 
of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember’s presence and conduct on Indian 
lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to impose.”). 
 17. Althouse, supra note 15, at 730 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). 
 18. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
4REE.DOC 3/23/02  11:52 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
142 
First, a tribe might retain civil authority over a nonmember on an 
Indian reservation when that nonmember enters into a consensual 
relationship with the tribe.19 Second, a tribe might retain civil au-
thority over a nonmember when that nonmember’s “conduct threat-
ens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”20 
a. Montana’s consensual relations exception. The Montana Court 
relied on Williams v. Lee21 as authority for its first exception. In Wil-
liams, a non-Indian who operated a store on the Navajo Indian Res-
ervation brought suit against tribal members in state court to recover 
the cost of goods sold.22 The Court found that the state court had 
no jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit because the transaction took 
place on the reservation. Recognizing its history of “guard[ing] the 
authority of Indian governments over their reservations,”23 the Court 
emphasized that state adjudicatory authority would “infring[e] on 
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled 
by them.”24 
The Court has, however, determined that only certain relation-
ships qualify as consensual.25 In Montana, the Court cited cases that 
dealt only with commercial dealings, leading lower courts to subse-
 
 19. Id. (“A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities 
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” (citing Washington v. Confed-
erated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–154 (1980); Williams v. Lee, 
358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 
F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905)). 
 20. Id. at 566 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386, (1976); Williams, 
358 U.S. at 220; Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128–129 
(1906); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898)). Montana Catholic and Thomas v. Gay 
both found that a tax on cattle grazing on tribal lands was too remotely related to tribal inter-
ests to warrant tribal authority. See Montana Catholic, 200 U.S. at 128–29; Thomas, 169 U.S. 
at 273. 
 21. 358 U.S. 217. 
 22. Id. at 217–18. 
 23. Id. at 223. 
 24. Id. at 220. 
 25. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1833 (2001) 
(“The consensual relationship must stem from ‘commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements,’ . . . and a nonmember’s actual or potential receipt of tribal police, fire, and 
medical services does not create the requisite connection.” (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 
565)); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997) (“Measured against [the] cases 
[cited in Montana], the Fredericks-Stockert highway accident presents no ‘consensual relation-
ship’ of the qualifying kind.”). 
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quently hold that a relationship must involve commercial dealings in 
order to be viewed as a consensual relationship under this excep-
tion.26 
b. Montana’s political integrity exception. Although the Montana 
Court’s language suggests the second exception could be quite 
broad, “the Supreme Court has limited the general holding to activi-
ties that the United States considers critical to tribal self government, 
and to internal relations.”27 A tribe might be able to assert authority 
in order to protect its political integrity in only a few situations—the 
punishment of tribal offenders, the determination of tribal member-
ship, the regulation of domestic relations, the prescription of rules of 
inheritance.28 
The Court struggled with the meaning of this exception in Bren-
dale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,29 
where it held in a plurality opinion that a tribe had authority to zone 
 
 26. See, e.g., Boxx v. Long Warrior, 265 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A relationship 
is of the qualifying kind only if it is both consensual and entered into through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. To the extent that the relationship cannot be 
neatly categorized as one entered through commercial dealing, contracts, or leases, but is in-
stead characterized as one entered through ‘other arrangements,’ we conclude that such ar-
rangements also must be of a commercial nature.”); cf. In re W. Wireless Corp., CC No. 96-
45, 2001 WL 1181249 (F.C.C.), at *5 (finding a consensual relationship between wireless 
carrier and tribe under Montana, where wireless carrier “expressly consented to the Tribe’s 
regulatory authority, and the Tribe has rights to participate extensively in and administer the 
service plan”). 
 27. Althouse, supra note 15, at 735–36. 
 28. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe arguably 
additionally grants tribes the authority under the second exception to tax nonmembers who 
chose to do business on the reservation. 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (finding that the tribe’s 
authority to tax nonmembers who chose to do business on the reservation falls within its sov-
ereign powers as a “necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management”). 
However, the authority to tax nonmembers may also fall under the consensual relations excep-
tion. See Atkinson Trading, 121 S. Ct. at 1832–33 (citing Merrion in discussing whether a 
consensual relationship existed between a hotel and the tribe that sought to tax it). 
Montana’s political integrity exception draws its authority in part from Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). In Fisher, a Montana state court sought to exert authority over 
an adoption proceeding that took place on the reservation of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe in 
Montana. See id. at 383. The Court found that the tribal court had authority over the proceed-
ing because the “litigation [arose] out of conduct on an Indian reservation” and unless Con-
gress enacts a law stating otherwise, the “resolution of conflicts between the jurisdiction of 
state and tribal courts has depended . . . on ‘whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’” Id. at 386 (quoting Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). Notably, however, Fisher involved only tribal mem-
bers, not the assertion of a tribe’s authority over nonmembers. See id. 
 29. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
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certain parcels of land held by nonmembers on a reservation, but not 
other parcels on the same reservation. Justice White’s opinion lim-
ited Montana’s health and welfare exception by determining that “a 
tribe’s authority need not extend to all conduct that ‘threatens or has 
some direct effect’ . . . but instead depends on the circumstances.”30 
Justice Blackmun, however, indicated that “fundamental sovereign 
power of local governments to control land use is especially vital to 
Indians, who enjoy a unique historical and cultural connection to the 
land”31 and emphasized that “the nature of land ownership does not 
diminish the tribe’s inherent power to regulate in the area.”32 The 
Court reached no consensus on the proper scope of this exception, 
and “[i]n the end, the tribes’ power to zone each parcel of land 
turned on the extent to which the tribes maintained ownership and 
control over the areas in which the parcels were located.”33 
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,34 the last major Supreme 
Court decision dealing with tribal authority before Hicks, the Court 
established a far higher threshold for the political integrity exception 
than originally articulated in Montana: “[U]nless the drain of the 
nonmember’s conduct upon tribal services and resources is so severe 
that it actually ‘imperil[s]’ the political integrity of the Indian tribe, 
there can be no assertion of civil authority beyond tribal lands.”35 
2. Tribal adjudicatory authority 
Although Montana dealt only with regulatory authority, in Strate 
v. A-1 Contractors 36 the Court “extended the Montana frame-
work . . . to limit tribes’ civil adjudicatory jurisdiction.”37 In Iowa 
 
 30. Althouse, supra note 15, at 736 (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429). 
 31. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 32. Id. at 457. 
 33. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2326 (2001) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 438–44, 444–47). 
 34. 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001). 
 35. Id. at 1834 n.12. The Court found that the tribe did not have inherent authority to 
collect a hotel occupancy tax from nonmembers operating a hotel on the reservation because 
the tribe established no nexus between the tax and the tribe’s relationship with the hotel. Id. at 
1834–35; see also Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 120 (describing the Court’s holding). 
 36. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
 37. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2321 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
520 U.S. at 453 (“As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not ex-
ceed its legislative jurisdiction . . . . Subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statues, and 
the two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts 
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Mutual,38 the Court found “[t]ribal authority over the activities of 
non-Indians on reservation lands [to be] an important part of tribal 
sovereignty.”39 
Determining a tribal court’s jurisdiction over civil court proceed-
ings “require[s] a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the ex-
tent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or dimin-
ished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes.”40 In National 
Farmers Union,41 the Court unanimously distinguished between 
criminal and civil proceedings by explaining that Congress has ex-
pressly granted federal court jurisdiction over criminal offenses aris-
ing between non-Indians and Indians but has not granted express 
federal jurisdiction over similar civil disputes.42 
 
 
with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally ‘do[es] not extend to the activities of nonmem-
bers of the tribe.’” (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565)); Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2315 n.9 (not-
ing that Strate “held that [adjudicatory authority] at best tracks [regulatory authority]”). 
 38. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
 39. Id. at 18. The Court held that tribes possess civil adjudicatory jurisdiction “unless 
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.” Id.; see also Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982) (“Because the Tribe retains all inherent 
attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper 
inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact.”); Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and 
for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence 
of clear indications of legislative intent.”). 
 40. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855–56 
(1985) (unanimous); see also Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Juris-
diction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal Ex-
haustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 562 (1997) (describing the Court’s 
holding). 
 41. 471 U.S. 845. 
 42. Id. at 854 n.16 (citing F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 253 
(1982)) (“The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian Country has 
been markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction.”). 
Although the Oliphant Court determined that tribes had no jurisdiction over non-
Indians for criminal offenses, that Court relied in part on an Attorney General statement that 
denied tribes jurisdiction over criminal proceedings but granted jurisdiction over civil proceed-
ings. The Attorney General’s opinion stated, in part, 
Congress has “paramount right” to legislate in regard to this question, in all its rela-
tions. It has legislated, in so far as it saw fit, by taking jurisdiction in criminal mat-
ters, and omitting to take jurisdiction in civil matter[s] . . . . By all possible rules of 
construction the inference is clear that jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves 
of civil controversies arising strictly within the Choctaw Nation. 
7 Op. Att’y Gen. 175, 179–81 (1855). 
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Following Montana’s precedent,43 however, the Court continued 
to consider land ownership as a threshold analysis in determining 
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. In Strate, the Court held that the 
Three Affiliated Tribes44 did not have jurisdiction over claims as-
serted against nonmembers and arising out of a car accident on the 
state road that ran through the reservation because the state road 
equated to non-Indian land,45 but left open the question of the 
proper jurisdiction for “an accident occur[ring] on a tribal road 
within a reservation.”46 Instead the Court stated in dicta, “We ‘can 
readily agree,’ in accord with Montana, . . . that tribes retain consid-
erable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land.”47 
Neither of the Montana exceptions applied to the facts of Strate. 
First, because neither party to the suit was a tribal member, no con-
sensual relationship existed.48 Second, because careless driving did 
not pose a direct threat on the “political integrity, the economic se-
curity, or the health and welfare of the tribe,” the second exception 
was likewise inapplicable.49 The Court found that an action arising 
 
 43. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). 
 44. The Three Affiliated Tribes are the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Airkara tribes. Strate v. A-
1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 443 (1997). They reside on the Fort Berthold Indian Reserva-
tion. See id. at 442. 
 45. Id. at 442, 454. In Strate, Fredericks, a non-Indian, was involved in an accident 
with Stockert, another non-Indian who worked for a non-Indian-owned enterprise doing con-
tractual work on the reservation for the tribe. Id. at 442–43. Fredericks sued Stockert and his 
employer in tribal court and the defendants argued for dismissal of the case, based on the 
court’s lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 444. After the tribal court ruled 
against dismissal of the case, the defendants commenced proceedings against jurisdiction in 
federal court. Id. In ruling against tribal court jurisdiction, the Court explained that “the right-
of-way North Dakota acquired for the State’s highway render[ed] the 6.59-mile stretch equiva-
lent, for nonmember governance purposes to alienated, non-Indian land.” Id. at 454. The 
Court pointed out that the tribe granted consent to the right-of-way, was compensated for use 
of the right-of-way, “expressly reserved no right to exercise dominion or control over the 
right-of-way,” and reserved no gatekeeping right to the highway. Id. at 455. The Court fur-
ther pointed out that the highway was open to the public and subject to the state’s control. Id. 
at 455–56. 
 46. Id. at 442. 
 47. Id. at 454 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 557); see also id. at 456 (“We . . . align the 
right-of-way, for the purpose at hand, with land alienated to non-Indians. Our decision in 
Montana, accordingly, governs this case.”). 
 48. Id. at 457 (The “tribes were strangers to the accident.”). 
 49. Id. at 452, 457 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). The Court emphasized that 
“[a tribe’s inherent power does not reach] beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations,” id. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564), 
concluding that “[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway acci-
dent at issue [was] needed to preserve ‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
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under the second exception must affect the integrity of the tribe as a 
whole, not simply redress the wrongs inflicted upon one tribal mem-
ber.50 
The court dismissed the fact that “[c]ivil jurisdiction over [non-
Indian] activities [on reservation lands] presumptively lies in the 
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision 
or federal statute,”51 interpreting the statement simply to mean that 
“where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmem-
bers” they also possess authority to adjudicate disputes arising out of 
such activities, but the Court also explained that “[a]s to nonmem-
bers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legisla-
tive jurisdiction.”52 
B. Tribal Authority over Federal Claims 
Determining a tribe’s jurisdiction “require[s] a careful examina-
tion of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has 
been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of 
relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties 
and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.”53 The Court 
has found that tribal courts are valid forums for vindicating federal 
rights.54 
 
and be ruled by them.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). An action 
arising under the second exception must affect the integrity of the tribe as a whole, not simply 
redress the wrongs inflicted upon one tribal member. 
 50. Id. at 459 (“Opening the Tribal Court for [Fredericks’] optional use is not necessary 
to protect tribal self-government; and requiring A-1 and Stockert to defend against this com-
monplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to ‘the political in-
tegrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes].” (quot-
ing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566)); see also Boxx v. Long Warrior, 265 F.3d 771, 777 (9th Cir. 
2001) (dismissing Montana’s second exception because “[t]he action in tribal court does not 
seek to enforce or control the distribution or consumption of alcohol on the reservation. 
Rather, it seeks damages for negligence”). 
 51. Strate, 520 U.S. at 451 (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 
(1987)); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2321 (2001) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (pointing out that Montana introduces the presumption of no sovereignty, while 
Washington and Fisher illustrate the two exceptions to Montana). 
 52. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18). 
 53. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855–56 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
 54. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (finding that tribal courts 
are appropriate forums for trying cases under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1303 (1994), and recognizing tribal courts as “appropriate forums for the exclusive 
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians 
and non-Indians”). 
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In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,55 the Court recognized 
in dicta that “tribal courts, like state courts, can and do decide ques-
tions of federal law.”56 The Court did not allow the Navajo Nation 
to try claims arising under the Price-Anderson Act57 solely because 
the statute clearly expressed a preference that claims be tried in fed-
eral courts by providing for an immediate removal from state courts 
to federal courts.58 Although the statute did not mention removal 
from tribal courts, the Court dismissed this problem as being due to 
simple inadvertence.59 
Although it has been suggested that Neztsosie holds “that the 
tribal exhaustion rule does not require abstention where the underly-
ing, substantive claim would be removable to federal court if 
brought initially in state court,”60 at least one federal appellate court 
has discredited this approach “because [Neztsosie] elsewhere empha-
sizes and relies upon the extraordinarily powerful congressional pref-
erence that nuclear accident claims be adjudicated in federal court, 
and it is therefore possible that the [Neztsosie] opinion is statute-
specific.”61 
II. NEVADA V. HICKS 
A. The Facts 
Approximately 900 members comprise the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Tribes in western Nevada.62 Hicks, a member of the tribe 
and a retired tribal police officer, lived on trust allotment lands 
 
 55. 526 U.S. 473 (1999). 
 56. Id. at 485 n.7; see also Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Ju-
dicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1241 (2001) (“Justice 
Souter was careful to point out [in Neztsosie] that only in cases involving complete preemption, 
such as those brought under the Price-Anderson Act, can defendants correctly assert that they 
need not exhaust their tribal court remedies.”). 
 57. 71 Stat. 576 (1957). 
 58. See Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 484, 485. 
 59. Id. at 487 (“Now and then silence [regarding tribal courts] is not pregnant.”). 
 60. Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 476). 
 61. Id. at 84 (finding that Neztsosie offers merely “a potential alternative basis for [the] 
ruling,” but basing its holding on other grounds and avoiding the issue of general tribal au-
thority to adjudicate federal claims (citing Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 486)). 
 62. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2001). 
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within the tribe’s reservation.63 In 1990, after Hicks was suspected of 
killing a California bighorn sheep off the reservation,64 the Nevada 
state court issued a search warrant to inspect Hicks’s property.65 Be-
lieving that the state court had no jurisdiction on the reservation, the 
judge issued the warrant “‘SUBJECT TO OBTAINING 
APPROVAL FROM THE FALLON TRIBAL COURT IN AND 
FOR THE FALLON PAIUTE-SHOSHONE TRIBES.’”66 The state 
wardens obtained a tribal court search warrant and, along with a 
tribal police officer, searched Hicks’s premises, finding no incriminat-
ing evidence.67 
After about a year, “a tribal police officer reported to the warden 
that he had observed two mounted bighorn sheep heads in respon-
dent’s home.”68 After obtaining a search warrant from the state court 
and once more obtaining permission from the tribe, the wardens 
searched Hicks’s home another time, again finding no evidence of 
the crime.69 
B. Procedural History 
Hicks brought civil proceedings in the tribal court against the 
state wardens in their official and individual capacities and the State 
of Nevada, as well as the tribal judge and the tribal officers, alleging 
that the state wardens and tribal officers damaged his sheep-heads 
and “that the second search exceeded the bounds of the warrant.”70 
In addition to alleging these claims under tribal law, Hicks brought 
various constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.71 The 
Tribal Court dismissed the claims against all tribal parties by directed 
 
 63. Id.; Respondents’ Brief, 2001 WL 57509, at *3, *5, Hicks (No. 99-1994). 
 64. The killing of a California bighorn sheep is a gross misdemeanor under Nevada state 
law. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 501.376 (1999). 
 65. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2308. 
 66. Id. at 2308 (quoting App. G to Pet. for Cert. 1). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. (citation omitted). This warrant “did not explicitly require permission from the 
Tribes.” Id. However, upon the state wardens’ securing a tribal court warrant, tribal officers 
accompanied the state wardens on the search. Id. 
 70. Id. “Respondent’s causes of action included trespass to land and chattels, abuse of 
process, and violation of civil rights—specifically, denial of equal protection, denial of due 
process, and unreasonable search and seizure . . . .” Id. 
 71. Id. Hicks’s causes of action under the federal statute included “denial of equal 
protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure.” Id. 
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verdict, and Hicks dismissed the claims against the state wardens in 
their official capacities, leaving only the claims against the state offi-
cials in their individual capacities and the claims against the State at 
issue in the Tribal Court.72 
The Tribal Court determined that it had authority to try both 
Hicks’s tribal and federal claims, and the Tribal Appeals Court af-
firmed.73 Thereafter, the state wardens and the State of Nevada 
sought a judgment in federal district court declaring that the Tribal 
Court had no jurisdiction to try the claim.74 Hicks also filed a motion 
for summary judgment regarding tribal court jurisdiction. The Dis-
trict Court granted Hicks’s motion, while denying the state defen-
dants’ motion.75 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s de-
cision, determining that because Hicks’s “home [was] located on 
tribe-owned land within the reservation,” the tribe could assert “ju-
risdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their ac-
tivities on that land.”76 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.77 
C. The Supreme Court’s Holding 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reversed the lower courts’ 
decisions regarding the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction.78 The Court 
found (1) that the Tribal Court had no authority to adjudicate 
Hicks’s tort claims against the state officials79 and (2) that the Tribal 
Court had no authority to try § 1983 claims.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the reasoning of the court in Nevada v. 
Hicks by examining each of the questions answered by the Court. 
First, it considers the Court’s analysis under the Montana test of 
tribal court jurisdiction for tort offenses arising from the state offi-
cials’ execution of process. Second, it evaluates tribal court jurisdic-
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2308–09. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at 2309; Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F.Supp. 1455, 1459 (1996). 
 76. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Nevada v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020 (1999)). 
 77. Nevada v. Hicks, 531 U.S. 923 (2000). 
 78. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 79. Id. at 2313. 
 80. Id. at 2315. 
4REE.DOC 3/23/02  11:52 AM 
137] Native American Sovereignty 
 151 
tion over federal claims by considering jurisdiction of the § 1983 
claims and the Court’s elimination of the exhaustion test. This analy-
sis casts doubt on the Court’s decision by suggesting that the Court 
misapplied Montana and failed to allow the tribe to initially evaluate 
its jurisdiction over federal claims. 
A. Tribal Court Jurisdiction over State Wardens: The Montana Test 
The Court first determined whether “the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Tribe ha[d] jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged tortious 
conduct of state wardens executing a search warrant for evidence of 
an off-reservation crime . . . .”81 Beginning with a recognition that 
“[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not 
exceed its legislative jurisdiction,”82 the Court first examined 
whether the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes had the authority to 
“regulate state wardens executing a search warrant for evidence of an 
off-reservation claim.”83 
The Court explained that Montana, as well as Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Tribe,84 “support the general proposition that the inher-
ent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activi-
ties of nonmembers of the tribe.”85 “Where nonmembers are con-
cerned, the ‘exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent 
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive with-
out express congressional delegation.’”86 
Three points from Montana played in the Court’s determination 
that the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked jurisdiction over 
Hicks’s claim—the importance of land ownership, the consensual re-






 81. Id. at 2309. 
 82. Id. at 2309 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)). 
 83. Id. at 2309. 
 84. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 85. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 
(1981)). 
 86. Id. at 2309–10 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). 
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1. Land ownership 
The Court dismissed the fact that the tortious actions occurred 
on tribal trust allotment lands, explaining that “[t]he ownership 
status of land . . . is only one factor to consider in determining 
whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to 
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’”87 Al-
though the Court noted that ownership of land “may sometimes be 
a dispositive factor” and recognized that “the absence of ownership 
has been virtually conclusive of the absence of tribal civil jurisdic-
tion,”88 it failed to recognize a reverse rule that events occurring on 
tribal lands can give rise to tribal court jurisdiction.89 
The Court distinguished the importance of land ownership in 
Montana and Strate by explaining that those cases rested on the 
proposition that the land ownership concept in those cases was a di-
vergence from Oliphant’s lack of distinctions based upon land, rather 
than the idea that “Indian ownership suspends the ‘general proposi-
tion’ derived from Oliphant that ‘the inherent sovereign powers of 
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the 
tribe’ except to the extent ‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.’”90 The Court found in-
stead that Oliphant drew no distinctions based upon land and Mon-
tana explained that “‘Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power 
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands,’ . . . implying that the 
general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian 
land.”91 
Finding that ownership by itself could not “support regulatory 
jurisdiction over nonmembers,”92 the Court considered instead 
whether the tribe’s jurisdiction was “‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations,’ and, if not, whether 
 
 87. Id. at 2310. 
 88. Id. 
 89. But see Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (holding that had the tribe sought to regulate 
hunting and fishing on tribal, it would have had authority to do so); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (leaving open the question as to whether the tribe would have had 
jurisdiction had the automobile accident occurred on tribal trust lands). 
 90. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2310 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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such regulatory jurisdiction ha[d] been congressionally conferred.”93 
Instead of following Montana by analyzing land ownership as a 
threshold factor, the Court employed a balancing test, finding that  
land ownership was not dispositive “when weighed against the 
State’s interest in pursuing off-reservation violations of its laws.”94 
Justice O’Connor argued in her concurrence that the Court 
failed to give appropriate weight to land ownership considerations.95 
She explained that, rather than laying out a blanket rule that tribes 
may never have jurisdiction over civil offenses involving nonmem-
bers, as is the case with criminal jurisdiction, Montana provides a 
“middle ground” analysis by “recogniz[ing] that tribes retain sover-
eign interests in activities that occur on land owned and controlled 
by the tribe, and provid[ing] principles that guide [a] determination 
of whether particular activities by nonmembers implicate these sover-
eign interests to a degree that tribal civil jurisdiction is appropri-
ate.”96 
Justice Souter, on the other hand, argued that Montana’s “pre-
sumption against tribal jurisdiction to nonmember conduct on fee 
land within a reservation [should also] apply . . . where . . . a non-
member acts on tribal or trust land,” stating that “land status within 
a reservation is not a primary jurisdictional fact, but is relevant only 
insofar as it bears on the application of one of Montana’s exceptions 
to a particular case.”97 He asserted that Strate set forth a rule that “a 
tribe’s . . . inherent civil jurisdiction to adjudicate civil claims arising 
out of acts committed on a reservation depends in the first instance 
on the character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed, 
not on the title to the soil on which he acted.”98 Finally, he sug-
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 2316 (“‘The State’s interest in execution of process is considerable’ enough to 
outweigh the tribal interest in self-government ‘even when it relates to Indian-fee land’” 
(quoting id. at 2312)). 
 95. Id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring). But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense 
Out of Nevada v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347, 354–55 (2001) 
[hereinafter Skibine, Making Sense] (finding “exasperating” Justice O’Connor’s statement that 
Montana did not clarify “‘whether the status of the persons being regulated or the status of the 
land where the hunting and fishing occurred, led the Court to develop Montana’s jurisdic-
tional rule and exceptions’” because the Montana Court made clear that a “‘nonmember’s 
hunting and fishing could be controlled on tribal land’” (quoting Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2325 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Montana, 450 U.S. at 556)). 
 96. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at 2318 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring). He continued, 
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gested that basing tribal authority upon land status would result in 
practical difficulties of administration.99 
2. Montana’s consensual relations exception 
In addition to disregarding the importance of land ownership, 
the Hicks Court dismissed Montana’s first exception in a footnote by 
explaining that consensual relations cannot exist between state offi-
cers and a tribe.100 Although the state wardens “‘consensually’ ob-
tained a warrant from the Tribal Court before searching [Hicks’s] 
home and yard,” the Montana exception was inapplicable notwith-
standing because the relationship between the state warden and the 
tribal court was public rather than private.101 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor criticized the fact that the 
Court “treats as dispositive the fact that nonmembers in this case are 
state officials”102 and pointed to several examples of consensual rela-
tionships between state and tribal governments already in exis-
tence.103 Even if a consensual relationship did not exist in Hicks,104 
 
The principle on which Montana and Strate were decided (like Oliphant before 
them) looks first to human relationships, not land records, and it should make no 
difference per se whether acts committed on a reservation occurred on tribal land or 
on land owned by a nonmember individual in fee. It is the membership status of the 
unconsenting party, not the status of real property, that counts as the primary juris-
dictional fact. 
Id. But see White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (“[T]here is a 
significant geographic component to tribal sovereignty.”). 
 99. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring) (“Trib[al] authority to land 
status in the first instance would produce an unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt.”). But see 
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 
(1979) (holding that a state’s exercise of checkerboard jurisdiction is constitutional). 
 100. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2310 n.3. 
 101. Id. (“Though the wardens . . . ‘consensually’ obtained a warrant from the Tribal 
Court before searching respondent’s home and yard, we do not think this qualifies as an ‘other 
arrangement’ within the meaning of [Montana’s exception]. Read in context, an ‘other 
arrangement’ is clearly another private consensual relationship . . . .”). 
 102. Id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She states, “The majority . . . dismisses the 
applicability of [the consensual relationship] exception in a footnote, concluding that any con-
sensual relationship between tribes and nonmembers ‘clearly’ must be a ‘private’ consensual 
relationship ‘from which the official actions at issue in this case are far removed.’” Id. (quoting 
id. at 2310 n.3). 
 103. See id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor points out, for in-
stance, that tribes may enter into contractual relationships with state governments “for services 
or shared authority over public resources,” explaining that “[s]ome States have formally sanc-
tioned the creation of tribal-state agreements.” Id. (citing as examples MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
18-11-101 to 18-11-112 (1997) (State-Tribal Cooperative Agreements Act); NEB. REV. STAT. 
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Justice O’Connor argued that “creat[ing] a per se rule . . . forecloses 
future debate as to whether cooperative agreements, or other forms 
of official consent, could ever be a basis for tribal jurisdiction.”105 
3. Montana’s political integrity exception 
Finally, the Court addressed “whether regulatory jurisdiction 
over state officers . . . is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government 
or to control internal relations.’”106 The Court emphasized that 
“[t]ribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be 
connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be 
governed by them.”107 However, it dismissed the fact that a tribe 
could exercise jurisdiction based solely on its inherent sovereignty by 
explaining that “it was ‘long ago’ that ‘the Court departed from 
Chief Justice Marshall’s view that the laws of [a State] can have no 
force within reservation boundaries.’”108 
Instead, the Court drew upon Strate to determine the ways in 
which tribes could exercise power to protect their self-interest, con-
cluding that a tribe’s authority includes only that which is necessary 
“‘[to punish tribal offenders,] to determine tribal membership, to 
regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules 
of inheritance for members.’”109 In acknowledging a difference be-
 
§§ 13-1502 to 13-1509 (1997) (State-Tribal Cooperative Agreements Act); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
74, § 1221 (Supp. 2001) (Governor may enter into cooperative agreements on the State’s be-
half to address issues mutually affecting the State and tribes)). Justice O’Connor additionally 
points out the “host of cooperative agreements between tribes and state authorities to share 
control over tribal lands, to manage public services, and to provide law enforcement.” Id. (cit-
ing as examples CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25198.1–25198.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 
2001) (hazardous waste management); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 44201–44210 (West 1996) 
(solid waste management); MINN. STAT. §§ 626.90–626.93 (Supp. 2001) (between state and 
tribal law enforcement); NEV. REV. STAT. 277.058 (Supp. 1999) (archeological or historical 
sites); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-11-12.1 to 9-11-12.2 (Michie Supp. 2000) (tax administration); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 25.075 (1999) (child support); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.25.010–26.25.040 
(1999) (child welfare); Id. §§ 79.60.010–79.60.090 (timber and forest management)). 
 104. Id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (comparing the brief for petitioners with the 
brief for respondents and stating that “[w]hether a consensual relationship . . . existed in this 
case is debatable”). 
 105. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (comparing the majority opinion, id. at 2310 n.3, 
with id. 2316). 
 106. Id. at 2310. 
 107. Id. at 2311. 
 108. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980)) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. Id. (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (quoting Mon-
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tween a tribe’s authority over nonmembers and a state’s authority 
over tribal members, the Court explained that while “[t]ribal asser-
tion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to 
that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by 
them,”110 state assertion of regulatory authority over tribal members 
is allowed even on tribal lands “[w]hen . . . state interests outside the 
reservation are implicated.”111 
The Court found that “[s]elf-government and internal relations 
[were] not directly at issue . . . since the issue [was] whether the 
Tribes’ law will apply, not to their own members, but to a narrow 
category of outsiders.”112 Dismissing Justice O’Connor’s argument 
that the majority opinion “give[s] nonmembers freedom to act with 
impunity on tribal land based solely on their status as state law en-
forcement officials,”113 the Court stated, “We do not say state offi-
cers cannot be regulated; we say they cannot be regulated in the per-
formance of their law-enforcement duties.”114 
The Court found three cases that validated the presumption that 
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians off the reser-
vation “entails the corollary right to enter a reservation . . . for en-
forcement purposes.”115 First, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
of Colville Indian Reservation,116 the Court “reserved the question 
whether state officials could seize cigarettes held for sale to non-
members in order to recover the taxes due,”117 suggesting that states 
might have this authority. Second, in Utah & Northern Railway Co. 
v. Fisher,118 the Court noted that “process of [state] courts may run 
into an Indian reservation . . . where the subject-matter or contro-
versy is otherwise within their cognizance.”119 Finally, in United 
 
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981))). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2311–12 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reser-
vation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)). 
 112. Id. at 2316. 
 113. Id. at 2332 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2317. 
 114. Id. at 2317. The Court points out that tribal members may still invoke state or fed-
eral authority to help them vindicate their rights. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2312. 
 116. 447 U.S. 134. 
 117. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312 (citing Washington, 447 U.S. at 162). 
 118. 116 U.S. 28 (1885). 
 119. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312 (quoting Fisher, 116 U.S. at 31). 
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States v. Kagama,120 the Court “expressed skepticism that the Indian 
Commerce Clause could justify [federal court] authority in deroga-
tion of state jurisdiction,”121 but finally concluded that the Major 
Crimes Act was valid because it did not “interfere with the process of 
the State courts within the reservation, nor with the operation of 
State laws upon white people found there.”122 
Concluding that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in 
executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state 
laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations,” 
the Court emphasized that giving the State the authority to exercise 
process on reservation lands held in fee by Indians would impair 
tribal government as little as the “federal enforcement of federal law 
impairs state government.”123 Additionally, because the Court found 
“[n]othing in the federal statutory scheme [to] prescribe[], or even 
remotely suggest[], that state officials cannot enter a reservation . . . 
to investigate or prosecute violations of state law occurring off the 
reservation,” the Court concluded that Congress had not taken away 
the state’s jurisdiction in Indian country.124 Finally, the Court relied 
on Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe125 to assert that the “reser-
vation of state authority to serve process [in federal enclaves] is nec-
essary to ‘prevent [such areas] from becoming an asylum for fugitives 
from justice.’”126 
In her concurrence, however, Justice O’Connor pointed out that 
in its analysis of Montana’s second exception, the Court failed to 
show how “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing 
process related to [an off-reservation violation of state law] is not es-
 
 120. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 121. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312. 
 122. Id. at 2312 (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383). 
 123. Id. at 2313. The Court also emphasized the social costs of allowing the tribe to get 
around the political integrity problem by suing the state wardens merely in their individual ca-
pacities. Id. (“‘Permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial so-
cial costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will 
unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.’” (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 638 (1987))). 
 124. Id. 
 125. 114 U.S. 525, 533 (1885). 
 126. Id. The Court’s holding implicitly overruled Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 
F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), where the Ninth Circuit held that “Arizona . . . could not enter the 
[Navajo] reservation to seize [a] suspect for extradition since . . . this would interfere with 
tribal self-government.” Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312 n.6 (citing Merrill, 413 F.2d at 685–86). 
4REE.DOC 3/23/02  11:52 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
158 
sential to tribal self-government or internal relations.”127 She ex-
plained that the mere fact that tribal and state governments share au-
thority over state lands does not equate to a nullification of tribal in-
terests “through a per se rule.”128 
B. Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over § 1983 Claims 
Although the majority concluded that the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Tribes had no authority to adjudicate Hicks’s claims under 
Montana, the Hicks Court still analyzed the tribal court’s authority 
to adjudicate § 1983 claims to ascertain whether such claims consti-
tuted congressional expansion of tribal-court jurisdiction.129 The 
Court began its analysis by dismissing the fact that suit was brought 
against the state officials in their individual capacities and concluding 
that “a State ‘can act only through its officers and agents.’”130 
Although the Court pointed out that state courts have general 
jurisdiction under the Constitution,131 the Court held that tribal 
courts “cannot be courts of general jurisdiction . . . for a tribe’s in-
herent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as 
broad as its legislative jurisdiction.”132 The Court stated that the 
“historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court 
jurisdiction over federal-law cases is completely missing with respect 
to tribal courts.”133 
 
 127. Id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2313). 
 128. Id. at 2329 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980)). 
 129. Id. at 2313–14 n.7 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)). 
Section 1983 provides for liability for any person who, acting under the color of law, “subjects 
. . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1999).  
Despite the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction was already limited by the Court’s analysis of 
Montana, the Court found the additional determination of the Court’s jurisdiction over § 
1983 claims necessary in order to ascertain whether Congress had enlarged tribal court juris-
diction, thus superceding the Montana test. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314 n.7. But see id. at 2332 
n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not at all clear to me that the Court’s discussion of the § 
1983 issue is necessary to the disposition of this case. [Strate] discusses the question whether a 
tribal court can exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers, irrespective of the type of claim being 
raised.” (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 n.14)). 
 130. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2313 (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879)). 
 131. Id. at 2313–14. 
 132. Id. at 2314. 
 133. Id.; cf. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“Under this system of dual sov-
ereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus pre-
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The Court emphasized that a severe anomaly would result from 
giving tribal courts general jurisdiction over federal claims: 
“[B]ecause the general federal-question removal statute refers only 
to removal from state court, . . . [w]ere § 1983 claims cognizable in 
tribal court, defendants would inexplicably lack the right available to 
state-court § 1983 defendants to seek a federal forum.”134 It dis-
missed the notion that it could create a right for removal from tribal 
court to federal court.135 
Justice Stevens argued in his concurrence, however, that a tribal 
court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over any federal claim 
“unless enjoined from doing so by a federal court.”136 He argued 
that the “majority’s analysis of [the] question [of § 1983 jurisdic-
tion] is exactly backwards” and concluded that rather than 
“start[ing] from the assumption that tribal courts do not have juris-
diction to hear federal claims unless federal law expressly grants them 
the power,”137 the Court should have allowed the tribe to assert gen-
eral subject matter jurisdiction, should it choose, “unless federal law 
dictates otherwise.”138 He also pointed out that “the majority’s hold-
 
sumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.”). The 
Court, however, failed to mention that Indian tribes had neither individual federal recognition 
nor organized tribal courts at the time of the Constitution’s drafting. 
 134. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314. The Court held that 
Strate’s limitation on jurisdiction over nonmembers pertains to subject-matter, 
rather than merely personal, jurisdiction, since it turns upon whether the actions at 
issue in the litigation are regulable by the tribe. One can of course say that even 
courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction have general jurisdiction over those sub-
jects that they can adjudicate . . . but that makes the concept of general jurisdiction 
meaningless, and is assuredly not the criterion that would determine whether these 
courts received authority to adjudicate § 1983 actions. 
Id. at 2314 n.8. 
 135. Id. at 2314–15. The Government as amicus curiae based its argument for such re-
moval on El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999). See Brief of Amicus Curiae 
United States at 24–26, Hicks (No. 99-1994), available at 2001 WL 28669. The Court, how-
ever, distinguished Neztsosie by pointing out that Neztsosie arose under Navajo tort claims that 
the Price Anderson Act “provided ‘shall be deemed to be . . . action[s] arising under’ 42 
U.S.C. § 2210; [thus] there was little doubt that the tribal court had jurisdiction over such 
tort claims.” Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 482 n.4). The Court 
also pointed out its reliance on the actual removal provisions of the Price Anderson Act, which 
evidenced a congressional preference for federal courts. Id. at 2315. 
 136. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 137. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 2314. 
 138. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens cited Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981), where the Court determined that state law governs a 
state’s subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance. Although the majority dismissed this case 
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ing that tribal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 
suits would, presumably, bar those courts from hearing such claims 
even if jurisdiction over nonmembers would be proper under 
Strate.”139 
IV. THE BEND IN THE ROAD: DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS OF 
JURISDICTIONAL TESTS 
The majority’s failure to properly apply its recognized tests for 
jurisdiction resulted in a decision that severely limits a tribe’s civil ju-
risdiction over nonmembers. The Court’s decision has two fatal flaws 
that may affect the ability of tribes to assert their jurisdiction in the 
future. First, the majority’s failure to properly apply Montana re-
sulted in a constriction of the Court’s precedent regarding the role 
of land ownership and Montana’s exceptions. Second, the majority’s 
failure to give the tribal court an opportunity to determine its juris-
diction over § 1983 claims suggests that exhaustion has become an 
exception, rather than the rule. This section will address each of 
these concerns in turn. 
 
by emphasizing that the Constitution grants states general adjudicatory authority, while grant-
ing no such authority to tribes, see Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314, Justice Stevens argued that the 
key principle to consider was “the simple, common-sense notion that it is the body creating a 
court that determines what sorts of claims that court will hear.” Id. at 2333 n.2 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). See generally Nat’l Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851, 856 
(1985) (Because “tribes . . . retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing political 
communities that were formed long before Europeans first settled in North America,” jurisdic-
tional determinations “should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 139. Id. at 2333 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
The majority claims that “Strate is [the] ‘federal law to the contrary’” that explains 
its restriction of tribal court subject-matter jurisdiction over § 1983 suits. But Strate 
merely concerned the circumstances under which tribal courts can exert jurisdiction 
over claims against nonmembers. It most certainly does not address the question 
whether, assuming such jurisdiction to exist, tribal courts can entertain § 1983 
suits . . . .  
  Of course, if the majority, as it suggests, is merely holding that § 1983 does 
not enlarge tribal jurisdiction beyond what is permitted by Strate, its decision today 
is far more limited than it might first appear from the Court’s sometimes sweeping 
language. After all, if the Court’s holding is that § 1983 merely fails to “enlarg[e]” 
tribal-court jurisdiction, then nothing would prevent tribal courts from deciding § 
1983 claims in cases in which they properly exercise jurisdiction under Strate. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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A. Constriction of the Montana Test 
The majority changed the Montana analysis in three ways. First, 
it eliminated land status as a threshold consideration. Next, it con-
stricted the meaning of both Montana exceptions. 
1. Character of land 
In contrast to the Montana Court, the Hicks Court failed to ana-
lyze land ownership as a threshold consideration, instead making 
land ownership a mere factor in the analysis of Montana’s excep-
tions. In Montana, the Court considered whether the tribe had ju-
risdiction over activities within the borders of the reservation solely 
because those lands belonged in fee to nonmembers, acknowledging 
that had the tribe sought to regulate activities on tribal lands, it 
would have had the authority to do so.140 Limiting its holding to 
“the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fish-
ing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of 
the Tribe,” the Montana Court found that a tribe does not have the 
authority to regulate non-Indian activities on lands not owned by the 
tribe or its members.141 
Other cases have attached a similar importance to land status. In 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,142 the Court stated that 
“there is a significant geographical component to tribal sover-
eignty.”143 Brendale, although a plurality opinion, set forth the rule 
that the “the extent to which the tribes maintained ownership and 
control over the areas in which the parcels were located” dictated 
whether the tribe had power to zone the particular tract.144 In Strate, 
the Court specifically left open the question of tribal jurisdiction over 
an automobile accident occurring on a reservation road.145 Finally, in 
 
 140. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). The Court affirmed that the 
tribe could both exclude nonmembers from the land and condition nonmembers’ entry onto 
the land. See id. 
 141. Id. (emphasis added). 
 142. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
 143. Id. at 151. 
 144. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2326 (2001) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408, 438–47 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
 145. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1999) (“We express no view on 
the governing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reserva-
tion.”). 
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Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, decided just one month before 
Hicks, the Court found the character of land significant when it de-
termined that a tribe’s power to tax “only extended to ‘transactions 
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its 
members.’”146 
This case law suggests that the majority in Hicks mischaracterized 
Montana when it dismissed land ownership as only one factor in the 
analysis of a tribe’s jurisdiction.147 In her concurrence, Justice 
O’Connor set forth the rule that the Court should have followed—
the Court should have recognized that “tribes retain sovereign inter-
ests in activities that occur on land owned and controlled by the 
tribe”148 and should have analyzed “whether [the state wardens’] ac-
tivities . . . implicate these sovereign interests to a degree that tribal 
civil jurisdiction is appropriate.”149 
Not only does land ownership play a role in the initial jurisdic-
tional analysis, but it also evidences the power to exclude, a necessary 
attribute of self-government.150 Land ownership is crucial in deter-
mining the “extent to which the tribes maintained ownership and 
control.”151 Hicks, a tribal member, owned the land on which the 
 
 146. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Atkinson Trading 
Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1831 (2001) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982))) (emphasis added). 
 147. See id. at 2310. 
 148. Id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2329 (O’Connor, J. concurring); see also Skibine, Making Sense, supra note 
95, at 349, 355–59 (arguing that “one of the fundamental problems with the Court’s [Hicks] 
analysis stems from its failure to adequately conceptualize the so-called tribal ‘right-to-
exclude’”). 
 151. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2326 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Brendale v. Confeder-
ated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 438–44, 444–47 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137, 149). Justice O’Connor also pointed out that Montana 
emphasized the attributes of sovereignty that tribes retain, rather than focusing on only the 
attributes they lost: 
  To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some 
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-
Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, 
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A 
tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has 
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and 
welfare of the tribe. 
Id. at 2326 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
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alleged tort actions occurred. The tribe had significant control over 
his land and the nature of governmental intrusions into the land, as 
evidenced by the fact that the tribal court approved both search war-
rants and tribal officials accompanied the state wardens in performing 
the search.152 The Court’s dismissal of the importance of land owner-
ship suggests a constriction of an important aspect of Montana’s 
holding. 
Although Justice Souter pointed out in his concurrence that us-
ing mere land ownership to determine jurisdiction would result in an 
unworkable rule because jurisdiction would change just as quickly as 
title was conveyed, leaving the competing governmental authorities 
without accurate information about whether they had jurisdiction,153 
he failed to recognize that the Court has previously found checkered 
jurisdictional patterns constitutional.154 Additionally, the working re-
lationship between Nevada and the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes 
evidenced in this case,155 suggests that administrative difficulties 
could be overcome. 
2. The consensual relations exception 
Another glaring problem with the Court’s application of Mon-
tana is its dismissal of the possibility of a consensual relationship be-
tween states and tribes, as well as its disregard for such relationships 
already in existence.156 Even supposing that a consensual relationship 
did not exist in Hicks,157 “creat[ing] a per se rule . . . forecloses fu-
ture debate as to whether cooperative agreements, or other forms of 
official consent, could ever be a basis for tribal jurisdiction.”158 The 
Hicks holding places tribes at a severe disadvantage in enforcing their 
 
565–66 (1981)). 
 152. Id. at 2308. 
 153. Id. at 2322 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 154. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 
535 (1974) (finding checkerboard jurisdiction asserted by the state government constitu-
tional). 
 155. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2308; id. at 2330 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 156. See id. at 2327–28, 2330 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that tribes often en-
ter into contractual relationships with state governments, for instance, for the use of public 
resources, and pointing out that “[s]ome states have formally sanctioned the creation of tribal-
state agreements”); see also supra note 103. 
 157. See supra note 104. 
 158. Id. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The majority disclaims having rejected this. 
See id. at 2310 n.3; id. at 2316. 
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rights under such state-tribe agreements because states could simply 
fail to perform under such an agreement and tribes would have only 
the remedy of suing through the federal government.159 
3. The political integrity exception 
In addition to entirely disregarding Montana’s first exception, 
the majority limited Montana’s second exception to be practically 
meaningless by suggesting that only those specific activities enumer-
ated in Montana constitute situations where tribes can assert jurisdic-
tion in order to protect self-government.160 
The Court relied on Justice White’s Brendale reasoning “that a 
tribe’s authority need not extend to all conduct that ‘threatens or has 
some direct effect’ . . . but instead depends on the circumstances.”161 
However, the reasoning of the Brendale plurality fails to allow for 
other possible activities that may threaten a tribe’s political integrity,  
including unregulated state service of process. As Justice Scalia stated  
for the majority in Hicks, a judicial opinion is only an opinion;162 
opinions may be revisited and reinterpreted. 
Additionally, the Court failed to consider the effect of state regu-
lation on the tribe. Although the Court has firmly established that 
 
 159. A suit directly against the state would probably be struck down under the Eleventh 
Amendment. Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that states have Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity against suits by Indian tribes arising under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988)). Even if the state allowed suit, a 
tribe would be unlikely to find redress of their rights in a suit adjudicated by the very entity 
that deprived them of their rights. 
 160. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2311 (“[T]ribes have authority ‘[to punish tribal offenders,] to 
determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe 
rules of inheritance for members . . . .’” (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
564 (1981); and citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997))). 
 161. Althouse, supra note 15, at 736 (quoting Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands 
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 429 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
 162. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2316 (referring to the Montana case by emphasizing, “this 
is an opinion, bear in mind, not a statute”); see also id. at 2327 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted): 
The majority . . . dismisses the applicability of [the consensual relations] exception 
in a footnote, concluding that any consensual relationship between tribes and non-
members “clearly” must be a “private” consensual relationship “from which the offi-
cial actions at issue in this case are far removed.” 
  The majority provides no support for this assertion. The Court’s decision in 
Montana did not and could not have resolved the complete scope of the first excep-
tion. We could only apply the first exception to the activities presented in that case, 
namely, hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land owned in fee simple by non-
members. 
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“the Indians’ right to make their own laws and be governed by them 
does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation” 
and in some cases “[s]tate sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s 
border,”163 in each case where the Court has determined that states 
have authority in Indian country, the Court has gone through a fact-
intensive analysis of (1) whether an express congressional grant of 
power for state authority in Indian country exists,164 and, if not, (2) 
whether the state action is preempted by federal law (balancing the 
state needs with tribal and federal interests in Indian self-
government)165 and (3) whether the state action infringes on reserva-
tion Indians’ right “to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.”166 State authority is limited when it is preempted by federal 
law, unlawfully interferes with the right of reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them, or violates Congress’s 
constitutional authority to regulate Indians under the Commerce 
Clause.167 
Justice O’Connor concluded in her concurrence that the Court 
failed to show how regulation of state wardens “executing process 
related to [an off-reservation violation of state law] is not essential to 
tribal self-government or internal relations.”168 Additionally, Justice 
 
 163. Id. at 2311. But see Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878); Langford v. Monteith, 
102 U.S. 145 (1880) (suggesting that state process may not reach Indian reservations because 
they are jurisdictional enclaves). 
 164. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (“Essentially, absent governing Acts 
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”). 
 165. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 156 (1980) (“The principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent 
sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommodation between the interests of the 
Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.” 
(citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973))). The test of 
tribal preemption applies when Congress has not spoken specifically on a subject and assumes 
that Congress intended to favor the tribe but balances this assumption with the state’s interest 
in exercising authority in Indian country. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 
U.S. 163, 176–77 (1989) (discussing the differences between regular federal preemption and 
tribal preemption); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983) 
(same). The test asks (1) if the state law obstructs federal policies in federal law, (2) whether 
this obstruction results in an impossibility of the tribe meeting federal requirements, and (3) 
whether the state’s interests are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. See White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142, 144–45, 148–49 (1980). 
 166. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220; see also Bracker, 448 U.S. at 442. Notably, this test only 
applies when non-Indians are involved. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164. 
 167. See Washington, 447 U.S. 134. 
 168. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2328 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2313). She 
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O’Connor noted that the Court excluded analysis regarding whether 
the officials were actually acting within the scope of their duties, 
suggesting that state officials might be liable individually if acting 
outside that scope.169 Hicks brought suit because the state officials 
“exceeded the scope of the search warrants and damaged . . . per-
sonal property.”170 Regulating the execution of a search process is an 
important part of maintaining tribal sovereignty.171 In fact, “[t]he ac-
tions of state officials on tribal land in some instances may affect 
tribal sovereign interests to a greater, not lesser, degree than the ac-
tions of private parties.”172 
Finally, Justice O’Connor argued that a tribe should not lose its 
“sovereign interests with respect to nonmember activities on its land 
. . . simply because the nonmembers in this case are state officials en-
forcing state law.”173 “[C]ases concerning tribal power often involve 
the competing interests of state, federal, and tribal governments,”174 
and “case law does not support a broad per se rule prohibiting tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal land whenever the nonmem-
bers are state officials.”175 
 
explains that the mere fact that tribal and state governments share authority over state lands 
does not equate with a nullification of tribal interests “through a per se rule.” Id. at 2329 (cit-
ing Washington, 447 U.S. at 156). 
 169. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court holds that the state officials may not be 
held liable in Tribal Court for these actions, but never explains where these, or more serious 
allegations involving a breach of authority, would fall within its new rule of state official im-
munity.”). 
 170. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 171. At least the State of Nevada thought so, as it originally conditioned the state offi-
cials’ execution of process upon their obtaining permission from the tribal court. See id. at 
2308. 
 172. Id. at 2329 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Although private parties do not have the 
same authority and duties as state officials, certainly a state official exceeding the bounds of his 
or her duty should be subject to tribal courts. 
 173. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 174. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 175. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) Justice O’Connor would have remanded the case for 
a proper application of Montana. Id. at 2329–30 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (comparing State 
v. Hicks 196 F.3d 1020, 1032–34 (1999) (Rymer, J., dissenting) with Nevada v. Hicks, 944 
F. Supp. 1455, 1466 (D. Nev. 1996)); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695–
96 (1993). She stated, 
  I do not believe that the Court properly has applied Montana. I would not 
adopt a per se rule of tribal jurisdiction that fails to consider adequately the Tribe’s 
inherent sovereign interests in activities on their land, nor would I give nonmembers 
freedom to act with impunity on tribal land based solely on their status as state law 
enforcement officials. I would hold that Montana governs a tribe’s civil jurisdiction 
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Justice O’Connor admittedly failed to address the fact that courts 
have generally required the tribe, rather than merely an individual, to 
show actual harm before asserting that tribal regulation is required to 
preserve tribal interests.176 Nevertheless, the majority failed to ana-
lyze the effect on the tribe at all, instead limiting the list of situations 
in which tribal regulation may be warranted to only those situations 
mentioned in Montana. Each scenario under Montana where a tribe 
may exercise regulatory authority—punishing tribal offenders, de-
termining tribal membership, regulating domestic relations among 
members, or prescribing rules of inheritance—is a situation over 
which tribes already would have retained authority under Wheeler 
because the incidents involve only internal affairs among tribal mem-
bers.177 Therefore, a Montana analysis to determine tribal jurisdiction 
over nonmembers in these situations would not even be necessary. 
The majority based its conclusion that “tribal authority to regu-
late state officers in executing process related to the violation, off 
reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or 
internal relations” in part on the assumption that giving states au-
 
over nonmembers, and that in order to protect government officials, immunity 
claims should be considered in reviewing tribal court jurisdiction. 
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2332 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
Hicks argued in his Supreme Court brief that the Court’s approval of the search war-
rants served as a basis for jurisdiction: 
  As to the second Montana exception, the alleged violations of the rights of a 
tribal member . . . threaten the tribe’s political integrity and welfare. To maintain its 
political integrity, effectiveness and ability to provide a judicial forum for those . . . 
who live under tribal law and jurisdiction and rely upon the court and its justice, the 
Fallon tribal court must be able to supervise the warrants it issues . . . . Respect for 
the limits set by a tribal court should be the same accorded to the limits on warrants 
issued by state or federal courts. To say that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction 
over claims against individuals purporting to act on the authority of the tribal courts 
would be to truncate tribal power to enforce tribal laws on tribal land and through-
out the reservation. Applying such a rule in this case would mean that the tribal 
court, in approving warrants to state officials, has no power to require that searches 
under those warrants be conducted according to the tribal court’s restrictions and 
limitations. 
Respondents’ Brief, 2001 WL 57509, at *15, Hicks (No. 99-1994). 
 176. See, for instance, Justice White’s opinion in Brendale, where he held that in order 
for the Yakima Indian Nation to have preemptive authority to zone on reservation lands, they 
would first have to show how the county’s zoning power would harm the tribe’s political in-
tegrity. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 
432 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
 177. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (finding that tribes retain au-
thority over their internal affairs); see also supra note 8 (discussing Wheeler’s internal/external 
distinction). 
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thority to exercise process on reservation lands held in fee by Indians 
would impair tribal governments as little as the “federal enforcement 
of federal law impairs state government.”178 Yet, the Court failed to 
acknowledge the special relationship that exists between tribes and 
the federal government.179 While states do not need protection from 
the federal government because of safeguards built into the federal 
Constitution, tribes need protection from state governments. Allow-
ing state officials unchecked access onto tribal lands in order to serve 
process could lead to an abuse of state power.180 
B. Possible Limits on Tribal Jurisdiction over Federal Claims 
Neztsosie makes clear that, absent plain legislative intent evidenc-
ing otherwise, tribal courts generally have jurisdiction over federal 
claims: “Under normal circumstances, tribal courts, like state courts, 
can and do decide questions of federal law, and there is no reason to 
think that questions of federal preemption are any different.”181 In 
 
 178. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2313. 
 179. See supra note 5. 
 180. States have historically fought against tribal sovereignty and self-government. See, 
e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (state attempt to 
regulate Indian gaming found unconstitutional); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 
470 U.S. 226 (1985) (suit by tribe against state for unlawful possession of land); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1831) (discussing state attempts to allow white 
settlers onto Indian lands). 
Respondent Hicks argued in his brief, 
The contemporary reality for the present case includes considerations of the negative 
impact on needed state-tribal cooperation that would potentially follow a decision of 
this Court providing state law enforcement officials with blanket immunity from 
tribal authority. Only recently have tribes and states been able to find sufficient 
common ground and respect for each other’s sovereignty in order to establish coop-
erative arrangements for law enforcement and other mutual governance concerns. A 
decision rendering state officials completely immune from suit in tribal court, while 
leaving tribal officials exposed to suit in state courts, will significantly undermine this 
complex, burgeoning and vitally necessary framework of state-tribal intergovern-
mental cooperation, by creating disincentives for tribal government officials who are 
asked to permit state officials onto tribal lands to enforce state laws. 
Respondents’ Brief, 2001 WL 57509, at *7, Hicks (No. 99-1994). 
The flaw in this analysis, though, is that it suggests that tribes are somehow inferior to 
state governments and therefore need special protection from states. Cf. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (“[P]referential programs [for African Americans] 
may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve suc-
cess without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth.”). 
 181. El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 485 n.7 (1999). Although the de-
fendants in this case do not have to exhaust their remedies in tribal court, the Court explains 
that this results from the removal requirement placed in the statute. See id. at 485–86. 
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reaching his conclusion that tribal courts have no adjudicative au-
thority, Justice Scalia relied on Strate v. A-1 Contractors where the 
Court stated, “As to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdic-
tion does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”182 However, Justice 
Scalia took this statement out of context. The Court in Neztsosie 
clarified that “Strate dealt with claims against nonmembers arising 
on state highways, and ‘express[ed] no view on the governing law or 
proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a res-
ervation.’”183 Further, the El Paso Court found that a simple asser-
tion by the defendants that the tribe lacked jurisdiction under the 
Price-Anderson Act (because tribes do not have authority to regulate 
atomic energy) did not satisfy the question of tribal jurisdiction.184 
Unlike Strate, but like Neztsosie, Hicks arose out of actions that 
took place on tribal lands. Prior precedent declared that in order to 
determine that an Indian tribe lacks authority to try § 1983 suits, the 
Court must examine the extent to which the tribe’s “sovereignty has 
been altered, divested, or diminished” and evaluate the “relevant 
statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and else-
where, and administrative or judicial decisions.”185 The Hicks Court 
performed none of this analysis in its opinion, thus suggesting, con-
trary to precedent, that tribal courts can never adjudicate federal 
claims. 
V. LOOKING AROUND THE BEND: THE FUTURE OF 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
After Hicks, future application of the Montana test remains ques-
tionable and could take one of two possible routes. However, re-
gardless of the outcome of a Montana analysis, based on the Court’s  
treatment of a tribe’s authority to try § 1983 claims, tribes are likely 
to have little jurisdiction over federal claims. 
A. The Future of Montana 
Montana rested in part upon a threshold consideration of land 
status. Where land was owned in fee by the tribe or held in trust for 
 
 182. 520 U.S. 438, 453; see Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309, 2314. 
 183. 526 U.S. at 482 n.4 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 442). 
 184. See id. at 482–83. 
 185. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855–56 (1985) (foot-
note omitted). 
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the tribe, Montana suggested that tribes would have authority to 
regulate activities occurring on that land. However, the majority in 
Hicks relegated land status from a threshold question to a mere fac-
tor in the analysis of Montana’s exceptions. Thus, the emphasis that 
the Court places on land status in the future will set the framework 
for the entire Montana test.186 
The Hicks holding is limited to the question of tribal court juris-
diction over state officials, leaving open the question of jurisdiction 
over nonmembers in general.187 Land could possibly be more than a 
mere factor in a context not involving state officials.188 The Supreme 
Court may take two approaches as it applies the Hicks revised Mon-
tana test to future cases: It may either limit its holding to facts simi-
lar to those in Hicks, the execution of a state search warrant on a res-
ervation for an off-reservation state offense, or it may interpret Hicks 
broadly to limit tribal jurisdiction on tribal lands to those cases fal-
ling under the narrow Montana exceptions defined in Hicks. 
Lower courts in the short time since Hicks was adjudicated have 
followed the first approach, categorizing Hicks as applying only to a 
narrow class of cases where state officials are exercising process on a 
reservation for off-reservation offenses.189 However, the unwilling-
 
 186. See Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 119–20: 
  Prior to Hicks, most legal analysts read the Montana “rule” as applying only in 
circumstances where tribal civil authority was asserted over non-members on their 
fee lands within the reservation. In other words, tribal civil jurisdiction over all per-
sons on tribal trust lands was presumptively acknowledged, or, in Montana’s terms, 
viewed as “necessary to protect tribal self-government.” Indeed, this is the view 
taken by Justice O’Connor (joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens) . . . . But the ma-
jority in Hicks said, “Not necessarily.” According to the Court, the general rule of 
Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land . . . . 
 187. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309 n.2. 
 188. But see Krakoff, supra note 56, at 1233–34 (2001) (“There is some room left to 
speculate that other circumstances might also warrant the exertion of tribal authority over non-
members, but the presumption certainly runs against the tribes.”). 
 189. In Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, No. 99-2618, 2001 WL 1117281 (7th Cir. 
Sept. 21, 2001), the court articulated the holding of Hicks as follows: “[T]ribal authorities 
lacked legislative jurisdiction to regulate the activities of state officials on reservation land when 
those officials were investigating off-reservation violations of state law.” Id. at *1 (citing Hicks, 
121 S. Ct. at 2318). The court noted that because the issue at bar, the grant of TAS status 
under the Clean Water Act to the Mole Lake Band, did not “involve any question of the tribe’s 
ability to restrict activities of state law enforcement authorities on the reservation, when those 
officials [were] investigating off-reservation crimes, . . . the rule of Hicks . . . [was] not impli-
cated.” Id. at *6; see also United States v. Archambault, No. CR 00-30089, 2001 WL 
1297767, at *15 (D.S.D. Oct. 18, 2001) (rejecting application of Hicks to a double jeopardy 
question arising from tribal prosecution of a nonmember Indian); Prairie Band of Potawatomi 
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ness of these courts to expand the Hicks holding may be due merely 
to a desire not to be overruled. 
Despite the assertion of Hicks’s limited holding, the Supreme 
Court Justices gave little surety that Hicks would actually be limited 
as stated. Four Justices, Justice O’Connor, Justice Breyer, Justice 
Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg, held that land ownership is a factor in 
determining tribal authority.190 Justice Ginsburg clarified in her con-
currence that Justice Scalia’s majority holding is limited to tribal 
court jurisdiction over state officials executing state law, suggesting 
that in other cases land status could be a large factor and that the 
question of tribal jurisdiction on tribal land over nonmembers still 
exists.191 However, no other member of the Court joined her con-
currence,192 and Justice Souter held in his concurrence193 that land 
ownership is not a factor and that the Court should proceed directly 
to the Montana test in determining tribal jurisdiction.194 Although 
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia left no clear opinion about the status of  
land ownership,195 neither justice has historically defended tribal sov-
ereignty.196 
 
Indians v. Richards, No. 99-4136-DES, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2284 (D. Kan. Feb. 8, 2002) 
(rejecting application of Hicks to the issue of whether a plaintiff tribe may enjoin officials of the 
State of Kansas from “applying or enforcing Kansas motor vehicle registration or titling laws 
against [an Indian tribe and those who] operate or own a vehicle registered or titled under [the 
tribe’s] registration code”); Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 120 (“While the Hicks holding 
is narrow—state officers are not subject to tribal regulation in the performance of their law-
enforcement duties—our main concern lies with the majority’s analysis that subjects inherent 
tribal authority to challenge by nonmembers, even when exercised on tribal trust lands.”). 
 190. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2324 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2324–2333 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens); id. at 2333–2334 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Breyer). Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence suggests that 
land ownership is a large factor. See id. at 2324 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 191. See id. at 2324 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 192. See also Krakoff, supra note 56, at 1236 (suggesting that because Justice Ginsburg 
joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion her concurrence lacks credibility). 
 193. Justice Souter was joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy. 
 194. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2318 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 195. Justice Scalia did state in his majority opinion that “[t]he question . . . whether 
tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction are coextensive is simply answered by the con-
currence in the affirmative. As Justice Souter’s separate opinion demonstrates, it surely deserves 
more considered analysis.” Id. at 2318. 
 196. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001) 
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that injury under Montana’s second exception must be “demon-
strably serious and must imperil” the tribe, establishing a higher hurdle than Montana); Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that Congress did not 
have power to allow suits by tribes against states under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); 
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The second approach that the Court could take would be to fol-
low Justice Souter’s reasoning by applying the Montana test, even on 
tribal and trust land. This view would virtually eliminate land status 
as a threshold fact in the analysis of tribal jurisdiction. Those who be-
lieve that Hicks will open the door for future adoption of Justice 
Souter’s approach base their fears on the idea that the case evidences 
a “jurisprudential trend advancing the sovereignty of states and the 
interests of nontribal members in Indian country at the expense of 
tribal rights to self-determination.”197 Ultimately, this fear reflects 
the Court’s apparent concern for the rights of nonmembers who may 
not participate in tribal government and may be tried in tribal courts 
with no federal court review or constitutional protections equal to 
those of defendants in state and federal courts.198 
B. The Future of Tribal Adjudication of Federal Claims 
While the exact application of Montana in future cases is uncer-
tain, the Court has made it clear that no presumption favors tribal 
 
U.S. v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Sioux 
Nation should not receive compensation for lands taken in the Black Hills because it contrib-
uted to violence on the frontier); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 177 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting) (rejecting a 
balancing of state and tribal interests for determining state authority to impose tax on reserva-
tion cigarette sales because “Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional intent”); 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.) (no inherent tribal 
authority to criminally try nonmembers); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 
U.S. 202 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Scalia joined in this opinion arguing that Public Law 
280 granted California the right to regulate and prohibit reservation gaming although other 
forms of gaming were permissible in California.). See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie 
Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1995) (“As 
Chief Justice, [Rehnquist] has taken a general position against the sovereignty of Indian peo-
ple, and has upheld Indian self-government only to the extent that non-Indians are not af-
fected.”). 
 197. Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 118 (“In advocating narrow conceptions of 
tribal authority, the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence has increasingly reflected an ideology 
significantly at odds with that of the other branches of the federal government and, indeed, 
with emerging international norms respecting the human rights of indigenous peoples to self-
determination and to maintain their own cultures.”). 
 198. See id. at 118 (“[T]he key animating principle of [the Court’s] Indian law jurispru-
dence is solicitous protection of the interests of nontribal members . . . .”); Skibine, Making 
Sense, supra note 95, at 362 (“[I]n order to show jurisdiction over nonmembers, tribes will 
likely have to show that Congress has somehow authorized them to exercise civil powers over 
nonmembers through special legislation, treaties, or a federal preemption-type of analysis.”). 
Cf. Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its 
Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 303 (2000), quoted in 
Duthu & Suagee, supra note 11, at 119. 
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court adjudication of federal claims, primarily because at this point in 
time no federal court review is available for such claims.199 This rea-
soning focuses on protection of those who are not tribal members, 
rather than its previous course of maintaining the rights of tribal 
members. The ultimate conclusion of the case is clear—the Court 
will not hesitate to block tribal authority when the exercise of that 
authority stands in the way of the authority of other sovereigns.200 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Hicks, a resident on the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Indian Reserva-
tion, sought to assert his right to keep state officials from unnecessar-
ily interfering with his property. Instead of recognizing that his law-
suit had merit, the Court summarily dismissed the suit from tribal 
court with a holding that, if liberally construed, would virtually 
eliminate tribal sovereignty over nonmembers on tribal land while at 
the same time favoring a broad grant of state authority over tribal 
members on tribal land.201 
Federal Indian law is a complicated field, especially in the area of 
civil jurisdiction. In order to allow tribes and states to see clearly how 
to act, the Court must clearly and accurately apply its own common 
law. The only clear guideline that this case has produced is that tribal 
members’ assertion of claims against nonmembers will almost cer-
tainly not withstand judicial review if asserted against state officials 
and, depending on how the Court interprets the breadth of its hold-
ing, may not even withstand judicial review if asserted against any 
nonmember. 
 
 199. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314. 
 200. See generally David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of 
States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001) (dis-
cussing the Rehnquist Court’s defense of states’ rights and resulting abrogation of tribal 
rights). 
 201. See Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2311 (2001) (“State sovereignty does not end at a reserva-
tions border. . . . ‘Ordinarily,’ it is now clear, ‘an Indian reservation is considered part of the 
territory of the State.’” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 510 & n.1 
(1958); and citing Utah & Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885))). 
What the Hicks Court failed to consider is that since Fisher, several Supreme Court cases 
have found express limits on state authority in Indian country. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mesca-
lero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 
U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washing-
ton v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1974); Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
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The Court’s deviation from its well-worn jurisdictional tests 
leaves tribes not only without the security of known roads, but also 
without the security of continued vitality of their sovereignty. By re-
characterizing Montana and limiting tribal authority to try federal  
claims, the majority charted a future course for tribal sovereignty on 
a road covered with pitfalls. 
Melanie Reed 
 
